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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Rayland Brown appeals from the district court’s denials of his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea, his motion to disqualify the court, and his Rule 35(a) motion to correct an
illegal sentence. “Mindful” of Idaho authority to the contrary, Brown argues the district
court erred in denying his motions. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-8.)
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On May 22, 2012, a grand jury indicted Rayland Brown on forcible sexual
penetration by use of a foreign object. (No. 41488, R., pp.20-21. 1) As part of a plea
agreement, the state amended the charge to domestic battery in the presence of a child.
(No. 41488, R., pp.60-61, 74-75.) Brown entered a guilty plea on October 23, 2012. (No.
41488, R., p.77.) The district court entered a judgment of conviction on December 28,
2012, sentenced Brown to the custody of the State Board of Correction for a fixed term of
fifteen years with an indeterminate term of five years, and retained jurisdiction. (No.
41488, R., p.78.) Brown did not appeal from the judgment.
On August 29, 2013, the district court entered an order relinquishing jurisdiction
and executing the sentence imposed in the judgment. (No. 41488, R., pp.87-88.) Brown
timely appealed from that order. (No. 41488, R., pp.98-101.)
On September 18, 2013, Brown filed a motion under I.C.R. 35 seeking a reduction
of his sentence on the basis of leniency. (No. 41488, R., pp.90-91.) The district court
granted Brown’s motion, reduced the fixed term of his sentence from fifteen years to eleven
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Consistent with Brown’s opening brief, all citations to “No. 41488, R.” refer to the record
in Brown’s prior appeal in this case.
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years, and increased the indeterminate term of his sentence from five years to nine years.
(No. 41488, R., pp.106-07.) Brown timely appealed from that order. (No. 41488, R.,
pp.109-11.) In an unpublished decision, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the order
relinquishing jurisdiction and the order reducing Brown’s sentence. State v. Brown, No.
41488, 2014 WL 2553733, at *1 (Ct. App. Idaho June 4, 2014).
On June 27, 2014, Brown filed a petition for post-conviction relief. (R., p.22.) The
district court dismissed Brown’s petition. (Id.) On appeal, Brown did not challenge the
district court’s rationale for dismissing the petition. (Id.) Instead, he argued, for the first
time, that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in the underlying criminal
case. (Id.) Specifically, he argued “the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because
the State alleged the crime of domestic battery by filing an information instead of amending
the indictment and because the information was filed without a commitment by a
magistrate as required by article 1, section 8, of the Idaho Constitution.” (R., pp.22-23
(footnote omitted).) The Idaho Supreme Court, in a decision filed on December 22, 2015,
observed that Brown’s argument “certainly appears frivolous” and explained why in a
lengthy footnote. (R., p.23 & n.2.) The court refused to address the issue, however,
because Brown could not raise the issue for the first time on appeal in the post-conviction
case. (Id.)
On December 30, 2014, the district court judge presiding over Brown’s case retired.
(R., p.12.) Judge Hoagland was assigned Brown’s case. (R., pp.3, 12.)
On January 4, 2016, Brown filed a motion to correct or reduce his allegedly illegal
sentence under I.C.R. 35. (R., pp.14-16.) He cited article 1, section 8, of the Idaho
Constitution but did not explain its relevance to his case. (R., p.15.) The district court
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denied Brown’s motion on the bases that Brown’s sentence was not illegal on the face of
the record, Brown failed to state a basis for relief, any motion to reduce or modify his
sentence was untimely, and a Rule 35 motion to reduce Brown’s sentence had already been
filed and granted. (R., pp.27-28.) Brown did not appeal the district court’s decision.
On December 12, 2017, Brown filed another motion to correct an allegedly illegal
sentence under I.C.R. 35. (R., pp.31-34.) He argued that his sentence was illegal because,
although he had pled guilty to domestic battery in the presence of a child, the child was
upstairs sleeping at the time of the incident. (R., p.33.) The district court denied Brown’s
motion because Brown knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pled guilty to domestic
battery in the presence of a child and because a Rule 35 motion is not the appropriate
vehicle to challenge the facts underlying a conviction. (R., pp.52-53.) Brown did not
appeal the district court’s decision.
On January 29, 2018, after receiving two unfavorable rulings from Judge Hoagland,
Brown moved to disqualify Judge Hoagland without cause. (R., pp.55-56.) On that same
day, Brown filed yet another motion to correct his allegedly illegal sentence. (R., pp.5860.) He repeated the same argument he had already made to the Idaho Supreme Court in
his post-conviction appeal—namely, that the district court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction “because the charge in the Amended Information was different then [sic] the
charge in the Original Indictment and the Amended Information was not filed based upon
a commitment issued by a Magistrate after a preliminary hearing or its waiver.” (R., pp.5859.)
The district court denied Brown’s motion to disqualify and motion to correct an
illegal sentence. (R., pp.86-91.) The district court denied the motion to disqualify “because
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it was not timely filed.” (R., p.87.) The district court’s denial of the motion to correct an
illegal sentence rested on the Idaho Supreme Court’s reasoning in its decision on Brown’s
post-conviction appeal as to why Brown’s jurisdictional argument “‘certainly appears
frivolous.’” (R., pp.89-90.) Brown timely appealed. (R., pp.136-41.)
On March 2, 2018, Brown filed a motion to withdraw his six-year-old guilty plea.
(R., pp.92-93.) He argued that he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter a
guilty plea because his counsel was ineffective. (R., pp.99-103.) The district court denied
Brown’s motion, noting that his “assertions are clearly contradicted by the record of the
proceedings in this case,” because Brown was advised of his constitutional rights and
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived those rights when he pled guilty. (R.,
pp.132-33.) Brown timely appealed. (R., pp.152-57.)
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ISSUES
Brown states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Brown’s Rule 35(a)
motion to correct an illegal sentence?

II.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Brown’s motion to
disqualify?

III.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Brown’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea?

(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
I.

Has Brown failed to show that the district court erred when it denied his
Rule 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence?

II.

Has Brown failed to show that the district court erred when it denied his
motion to disqualify?

III.

Has Brown failed to show that the district court erred when it denied his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
Brown Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Denying His Rule 35(a) Motion
A.

Introduction
The district court properly denied Brown’s Rule 35(a) motion because it had

subject-matter jurisdiction over Brown’s criminal case. Brown argues on appeal that the
district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because “the Information was not based
upon the commitment of a magistrate following a preliminary hearing or its waiver.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.6.) He made the same argument to the Idaho Supreme Court in his
appeal from the dismissal of his post-conviction petition. Although the Idaho Supreme
Court refused to rule on the issue, it explained in a detailed footnote why Brown’s argument
“certainly appears frivolous.” Brown v. State, 159 Idaho 496, 497 & n.2, 363 P.3d 337,
338 & n.2 (2015). In short, the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction because “[a]n
information was filed in the [district court], conferring subject-matter jurisdiction upon that
court over the offense charged in the information.” Brown, 159 Idaho at 497 n.2, 363 P.3d
at 338 n.2.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Whether a trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a proceeding is an issue

of law that this Court reviews de novo.” State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 60, 343 P.3d 497,
502 (2015).
C.

The District Court Had Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over Brown’s Criminal Case
The district court properly found that it had subject-matter jurisdiction to impose

Brown’s sentence. (R., p.90.) The filing of an information “alleging an offense was
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committed within the State of Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the court.”
State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1132 (2004). The state filed an
information in the district court alleging Brown violated an Idaho statute while in Idaho.
(No. 41488, R., pp.60-61.) That action “conferr[ed] subject-matter jurisdiction upon that
court over the offense charged in the information.” Brown v. State, 159 Idaho 496, 497,
363 P.3d 337, 338 (2015).
Brown erroneously argues that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
because the information “was not based upon the commitment of a magistrate following a
preliminary hearing or its waiver.” (Appellant’s brief, p.6.) But, as the Idaho Supreme
Court has already explained to Brown, “[t]he requirement of a commitment by a magistrate
in article I, section 8, is not necessary to confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon the district
court.” Brown, 159 Idaho at 497 n.2, 363 P.3d at 338 n.2. Furthermore, Brown “clearly
and unequivocally consented to the amended charge” in the information when he pleaded
guilty (R., p.90), which means he “waived his right to a preliminary examination.” Brown,
159 Idaho at 497 n.2, 363 P.3d at 338 n.2; see In re Bates, 63 Idaho 748, 753, 125 P.2d
1017, 1019 (1942) (commitment for being a persistent violator, which was not even a
crime, rather than for the crime charged of grand larceny was “irregular and erroneous,”
but was waived by the failure to raise the issue before pleading guilty); In re Marshall,
6 Idaho 516, 518, 56 P. 470, 471 (1899) (“If the defendant had no preliminary examination,
and did not waive same, he should present that question to the trial court when called on to
plead, or be held to have waived it.”).

Because the charging document conferred

jurisdiction, Brown has failed to show error in the denial of his Rule 35 motion.
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II.
Brown Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Denying His Motion To
Disqualify
A.

Introduction
The district court did not err when it found Brown’s motion to disqualify under

I.C.R. 25(a) was not timely filed. Brown could only exercise his one disqualification
without cause by filing a timely motion to disqualify. His motion to disqualify was
untimely under the express language of I.C.R. 25(a)(2), however, because he waited to file
the motion until after the district court had rendered decisions on two contested motions.

B.

Standard Of Review
“[W]hen this Court reviews a district court’s actions pursuant to I.C.R. 25(a), this

Court exercises independent, or free, review.” State v. Larios, 129 Idaho 631, 633, 931
P.2d 625, 627 (1997).
C.

Brown’s Motion To Disqualify Was Untimely
The district court properly found Brown’s motion to disqualify “was not timely

filed.” (R., p.87.) Under Idaho’s criminal rules, “the parties each have the right to one
disqualification without cause of the judge.” I.C.R. 25(a). If any party files a first motion
to disqualify a judge without cause, “the motion must be granted if timely filed.” I.C.R.
25(a)(1) (emphasis added). Rule 25 sets deadlines for filing such a motion, including that
“[t]he motion must be filed before the commencement of a status conference, a pre-trial
conference, a contested proceeding or trial in the action.” I.C.R. 25(a)(2); see Larios, 129
Idaho at 633, 931 P.2d at 627 (“[O]nce the parties allow a judge to sit, the parties lose the
option to disqualify the judge.”).

8

Brown’s motion to disqualify the district court was not timely because he filed it
after the district court had rendered two decisions in his case. In December 2014, after
Brown had been sentenced and after the Idaho Supreme Court had affirmed the district
court’s dismissal of Brown’s petition for post-conviction relief, Judge Hoagland was
assigned to the case because the former judge retired.

(R., pp.11-12.)

After the

reassignment, Brown filed a motion to correct his allegedly illegal sentence under I.C.R.
35. (R., pp.14-16.) Judge Hoagland denied the motion. (R., pp.25-28.) Approximately
ten months later, Brown filed another motion to correct his allegedly illegal sentence under
I.C.R. 35. (R., pp.31-34.) Judge Hoagland denied the motion. (R., pp.49-54.) One month
after Judge Hoagland denied the second motion, Brown filed his motion to disqualify Judge
Hoagland. (R., pp.55-57.) Brown’s motion to disqualify Judge Hoagland was thus
untimely because Brown filed it after “the commencement of . . . a contested proceeding.”
I.C.R. 25(a)(2).
III.
Brown Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Denying His Motion To
Withdraw
A.

Introduction
The district court lacked jurisdiction to hear Brown’s motion to withdraw his guilty

plea. A district court’s jurisdiction to hear a motion to withdraw a guilty plea expires once
the judgment becomes final. The district court entered judgment here on December 28,
2012. The judgment became final 42 days later because Brown did not appeal. Brown did
not file his motion to withdraw his guilty plea until March 2018—more than five years
after the district court’s jurisdiction expired.
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B.

Standard Of Review
“Whether a trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over a proceeding is an issue

of law that this Court reviews de novo.” State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 60, 343 P.3d 497,
502 (2015).
C.

The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Hear Brown’s Motion To Withdraw
The district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Brown’s motion to withdraw his

guilty plea. 2 The Idaho Supreme Court “has long recognized that a court’s jurisdiction to
amend or set aside the judgment in a case does not continue forever.” State v. Jakoski, 139
Idaho 352, 354, 79 P.3d 711, 713 (2003).

“Absent a statute or rule extending its

jurisdiction, the trial court’s jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires once the
judgment becomes final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the
judgment on appeal.” Jakoski, 139 Idaho at 355, 79 P.3d at 714.
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) governs all motions to withdraw a guilty plea, and it
“does not include any provision extending the jurisdiction of the trial court for the purpose
of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.” Id. Accordingly, a district court does not have
jurisdiction to consider a motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed after the judgment has
become final. See id. (holding, where defendant “did not appeal the judgment, and it
therefore became final 42 days later,” that, “[t]hereafter, the district court no longer had
jurisdiction to hear a motion to withdraw”); State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 610, 614, 226 P.3d
552, 556 (Ct. App. 2010) (“The trial court here lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
entertain Peterson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the judgment of conviction
2

Although the district court denied Brown’s motion on the merits (R., pp.130-34), “parties
cannot waive subject matter jurisdiction, [and] it may be raised at any time, including for
the first time on appeal,” State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 227, 91 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2004).
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had become final upon this Court’s issuance of a remittitur some two months before
Peterson filed his motion.”); State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 378, 195 P.3d 731, 737
(Ct. App. 2008) (“When Armstrong moved to withdraw his guilty plea to felony injury to
children, the time for appeal from the judgment of conviction had expired and no appeal
was pending. Therefore, under Jakoski, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to grant the motion.”).
Jakoski, Peterson, and Armstrong control the outcome here. The district court
entered judgment in Brown’s case on December 28, 2012. (No. 41488, R., pp.77-80.) The
judgment became final 42 days later because Brown did not appeal from the judgment. 3
See Jakoski, 139 Idaho at 355, 79 P.3d at 714; Armstrong, 146 Idaho at 378, 195 P.3d at
737. Brown filed his motion to withdraw his guilty plea on March 2, 2018—more than
five years later. (R., pp.92-93.) Thus, the district court did not have jurisdiction to decide
his motion.

3

Although the district court retained jurisdiction under I.C. § 19-2601(4) (No. 41488, R.,
p.78), Idaho Appellate Rule 14 makes clear that the act of retaining jurisdiction under that
statute only extends the time to file an appeal “from the sentence”—not from the judgment
of conviction. I.A.R. 14(a). Even if the district court’s act of retaining jurisdiction
somehow tolled the time for Brown to file an appeal from the judgment of conviction, the
district court still did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain Brown’s motion to
withdraw because the district court relinquished jurisdiction on September 3, 2013 (No.
41488, R., pp.87-88), and Brown did not file his motion to withdraw his guilty plea until
March 2, 2018—more than four years too late (R., pp.92-93).
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s orders denying
Brown’s motion to correct his allegedly illegal sentence, motion to disqualify without
cause, and motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
DATED this 25th day of September, 2018.

/s/ Jeff Nye
JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 25th day of September, 2018, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below
by means of iCourt File and Serve:
LARA E. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Jeff Nye
JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
JN/dd
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